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Re: Sources: Full and Partial Coverage



Hello,

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 11:51:37AM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
> I don't see this as a justification for a product-centered view. If
> Shiny has 10 vulns, and only one has made an exploit kit, I have no
> use for the other 9 cves.  So it's an argument against a purely
> product-centered view.

As you said earlier "....vulns exploited by exploit packs are selected by 
the authors of the packs...." for a specific purpose. They may not care 
about the other 9 vulns but I, as system administrator, may care about
all 10 of them. Using a vulnerability to crash my box is useless for
an attacker who wants root access to the box so it may not end up in a exploit
kit. As a system admin I do care about acrash as it prevents my users
doing daily business so I would like to have CVEs for all 10 vulns
and not only one that made into the exploit kit.

Gaus



> 
> It is an argument that at least some level of source-cetricity may
> be useful, but that's probably not the only thing that can be taken
> from it.
> 
> Adam
> 
> On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 11:38:16AM +0100, Damir Rajnovic wrote:
> | Hi Adam,
> | 
> | This is interesting situation you are describing. Here is how I see a potential
> | scenario being played out. We select to cover products and SHINY is one of
> | them. To get vulnerabilities in SHINY we select Contagio as the source.
> | Things are working fine but Contagio is also providing information about
> | other products that are not on our list. The question is what to do with
> | this extra information? Is this what you are trying to illustrate?
> | 
> | Regarding treating exploit kits as products - they are products. If there is 
> | a vulnerability in the SW _itself_ it may get CVE assigned. The confusion
> | may arise if we are using that product as the information source so we
> | may want to assign a CVE to a vulnerability being described within the
> | exploit kit. To me, these two facets (product vs information source), are
> | orthogonal and should not be mixed. We can treat a product as an information
> | source. After all, a mailing list can be seen as a product (ok, ok - service,
> | like google) and we use it as information source without even thinking
> | about it. In the case of exploit kit the things are just more explicit but
> | the principle is the same.
> | 
> | Gaus
> | 
> | 
> | 
> | On Mon, Jun 11, 2012 at 12:07:02PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote:
> | > Sorry to come back into this discussion late.  I'd like to share a
> | > recent use case where coverage by product would have been
> | > insufficient.
> | > 
> | > My goal was to study how computers become compromised.  As a proxy for
> | > one subset of that, I was using the Contagio "overview of exploit
> | > packs" [1].  Foreach element in that list, I was investigating when it
> | > became publicly known, when it was patched, and several other
> | > properties of the vuln and the update.
> | > 
> | > The searches for which I had CVEs took me 5-10 minutes per CVE.
> | > Several of the ones for which I didn't have CVEs took between 2 hours
> | > and failed to finish.
> | > 
> | > The vulns exploited by exploit packs are selected by the authors of
> | > the packs, with a goal of compromising a large number of computers.  I
> | > don't believe any product-centered view of the world would be
> | > sufficient.
> | > 
> | > We could, perhaps, define this work as outside the goal of CVE, but I
> | > think that might be putting a patch management goal above a vuln
> | > management goal.  We should not do that accidentally, nor do I think
> | > it's a good prioritization.  We could work around it by adding things
> | > like exploit kits as 'products', but I believe that stretches the
> | > definition of products that most people here seem to have in mind.
> | > 
> | > Adam
> | > 
> | > [1] http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/overview-of-exploit-packs-update.html
> | > 
> | > On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 02:35:39PM +0100, Damir Rajnovic wrote:
> | > | Hi,
> | > | 
> | > | No, not really. By definition CVE is the best effort project. It is so
> | > | because we rely on others (i.e., vendors, researches) to provide the information.
> | > | Until we have vendors comitted assigning CVE themselves that will continue
> | > | to be so.
> | > | 
> | > | Estimating how many vulnerabilities are not covered can also be questioned.
> | > | Some vendors may quietly fix things and never admitting that fact. Would
> | > | you count that as lack of coverage? I would _if_ I manage to establish that
> | > | this really happened. What are other ways that vulnerability may 'escape'?
> | > | 
> | > | The bottom line is that I am a pragmatist and will take what there is available
> | > | to get the job done. If we cannot reliably estimate coverage I would still
> | > | use CVE.
> | > | 
> | > | Gaus
> | > | 
> | > | 
> | > | On Fri, May 18, 2012 at 12:51:56PM -0500, security curmudgeon wrote:
> | > | > On Fri, 18 May 2012, Damir Rajnovic wrote:
> | > | > 
> | > | > : Hear, hear! Defining the goal in the scope of products is much better 
> | > | > : than sources and I am saying this as a consumer of CVEs. I have a piece 
> | > | > : of SW and I would like to know what is going with it. If the currently 
> | > | > : used sources do not cover the product 100% then the workaround can be to 
> | > | > : publicly say "we cover product X to an estimate 80% (or whatever)". That 
> | > | > : way CVE consumers are told of the situation.
> | > | > 
> | > | > Does your answer change if the percentage cannot be answered with any 
> | > | > certainty at all?

==============
Damir Rajnovic <psirt@cisco.com>, PSIRT Incident Manager, Cisco Systems
<http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt>      Telephone: +44 7715 546 033
300 Longwater Avenue, Green Park, Reading, Berkshire RG2 6GB, GB
==============
There are no insolvable problems. 
The question is can you accept the solution? 


Incident Response and Product Security
http://www.ciscopress.com/bookstore/product.asp?isbn=1587052644


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Page Last Updated: November 06, 2012