Re: [VOTEPRI] 12 high priority candidates as of 5/1/2000
* Steven M. Christey (coley@LINUS.MITRE.ORG) [000502 19:07]:
> Elias Levy and Bill Wall brought up a number of different points
> voting information for this candidate. It touches on a number of
> issues which I think are important for CVE, so I am emphasizing it
> more than I usually would for a legacy candidate.
> - Steve
> Candidate: CAN-1999-0031
> Proposed: 19990728
> Assigned: 19990607
> Category: SF
> INFERRED ACTION: CAN-1999-0031 ACCEPT (3 accept, 1 ack, 0 review)
> Current Votes:
> ACCEPT(2) Wall, Cole
> MODIFY(2) Christey, Levy
> NOOP(1) Northcutt
> Christey> ADDREF HP:HPSBUX9707-065
> Christey> http://www.codetalker.com/advisories/vendor/hp/hpsbux9707-065.html
> Christey> According to the CERT advisory, this issue affects Internet
> Christey> Explorer 3.x and 4.x, and Netscape 2.x, 3.x, and 4.x.
> Christey> Include this in the description.
> Levy> Need a better description of the vulnerability there were several JS
> Levy> vulnerabilities in the same time frame that had similar results but
> Levy> were porly documented. This, the Bell Labs vulnerability, was one of them.
> Levy> This is one of the other ones:
> Levy> http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&msg=c%3dDE%25a%3dDBP%25p%3dSCN%25l%3dMCHH9EEA-970711140700Zemail@example.com
> Wall> Add Internet Explorer 5 also. See
> Wall> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms99-043.asp which allows
> Christey> MS:MS99-043 is already handled by CVE-1999-0793. This one is
> Christey> different because IE 3.x and 4.x are affected; for
> Christey> CVE-1999-0793, it affected 4.x and 5.x. Also, this one
> Christey> just allows someone to read cookies, HTML form data, and
> Christey> what URLs were visited. CVE-1999-0793 allows the attacker
> Christey> to read files on the target's computer. Thus this one is
> Christey> different than CVE-1999-0793, and MS:MS99-043 should not be
> Christey> added.
> Christey> The reference that Elias provided describes 2 bugs, neither
> Christey> of which is the "Bell Labs" bug, i.e. this candidate (just to
> Christey> confirm what Elias said; the CERT advisory explicitly thanks
> Christey> Bell Labs). The first bug *sounds* a lot like this candidate, but
> Christey> since it was "discovered by a Danish IS consultant company."
> Christey> The second bug describes the same symptoms as CVE-1999-0793.
> Christey> However, this reference only describes the problem for
> Christey> Netscape Nagivator; CVE-1999-0793 only mentions IE.
> Christey> Thus it's possible that the problem was identified and fixed
> Christey> for Netscape, and later "rediscovered" by Microsoft and
> Christey> addressed for Internet Explorer. (The CD:DISCOVERY-DATE content
> Christey> decision, when reviewed by the Board, will dictate what to
> Christey> do in these sorts of cases). But then again, they could be
> Christey> different bugs entirely, but they just happen to have the same
> Christey> the implementation, then maybe CD:SF-CODEBASE won't apply.
> Christey> We might be able to roll this second bug in with
> Christey> CVE-1999-0793; thus we may need to REASSESS CVE-1999-0793 in
> Christey> the future.
> Christey> It is possible that this second bug is the same as the
> Christey> "Singapore privacy bug" described here:
> Christey> http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&date=1997-07-28&msg=Pine.SUN.3.94.970728112219.25473Bfirstname.lastname@example.org
> Christey> http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&date=1997-07-22&msg=Pine.SUN.3.94.970726193056.27668Bemail@example.com
> Christey> These posts were on July 22 and 28. Singapore is dated after
> Christey> the initial CERT advisory and references LiveConnect, which
> Christey> Kuo Chiang, the person referenced in the above posts as the
> Christey> discovered, sent a followup a week later on August 1:
> Christey> http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=87602746719458&w=2
> Christey> But this is merely a clarification of the earlier problem, as
> Christey> his post includes a reference to a ZDNet article written
> Christey> on July 25.
> Christey> The poster referred to by Elias, Matthias Dominick, sent a
> Christey> followup to the CERT advisory saying that the Danish bug
> Christey> appeared to be fixed, but the Bell Labs bug wasn't.
> Christey> http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&date=1997-07-8&msg=c%3dDE%25a%3dDBP%25p%3dSCN%25l%3dMCHH9EEA-970710145437Zfirstname.lastname@example.org
> Christey> Two legacy candidates will eventually be created to handle
> Christey> these 2 other bugs, i.e. Singapore and Danish.
> Christey> In the meantime, the description for this one can be extended
> Christey> to mention the Bell Labs bug and include pointers back to some
> Christey> of the related posts.
> Christey> If this mess isn't an argument for a naming standard, I don't
> Christey> know what is :-) :-) On a more serious note, this is an
> Christey> indicator of why it may be important for CVE to provide a way
> Christey> of distinguishing between different bugs discovered in the
> Christey> same software at around the same time (CD:SF-LOC will address this,
> Christey> and is one of the first CD's we will discuss when I reintroduce
> Christey> them).
> >ACCEPT - voter accepts the candidate as proposed
> >NOOP - voter has no opinion on the candidate
> >MODIFY - voter wants to change some MINOR detail (e.g. reference/description)
> >REVIEWING - voter is reviewing/researching the candidate, or needs more info
> >RECAST - candidate must be significantly modified, e.g. split or merged
> >REJECT - candidate is "not a vulnerability", or a duplicate, etc.
> VOTE: MODIFY
Add "Bell Labs" to the description or name.