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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] PROPOSAL: Cluster 23 NETCONF - (12 candidates)
The following candidates are associated with network configuration, mostly dealing with filters of one sort or another. Some of these candidates satisfy the CVE vulnerability definition because they are useful for information gathering activities, even though they "work as advertised." Consider allowing traceroute or DNS zone transfers. Should those candidates be treated the same as running finger? Let's consider Gene Spafford's rule of thumb: >Any software that functions according to its specification, and whose >correct functioning is within the bounds of a common security policy >(but not necessarily *every* policy) will NOT be considered a >vulnerability for inclusion in the CVE." > >the finger program would not be a vulnerability so long as all >of its functions are correct and known. We might allow its use in >an academic environment, so it is not a vulnerability. Does this rule of thumb apply to the candidates in this NETCONF cluster? A different issue - how far do we go to separate the functions of various devices on the network? In the draft CVE, I've identified two different types of devices: hosts, and network management devices (e.g. routers, firewalls, IDSes) which deal with managing the traffic between hosts. The roles of routers/firewalls/IDSes/etc. are nearly interchangeable, so I do not think it is appropriate to make separate CVE entries for each one, in most cases. I call this the "Two Different Network Devices" content decision, which is a specialization of "Different Functionality, Different Configuration Problem." - Steve Summary of votes to use (in ascending order of "severity"): ACCEPT - member accepts the candidate as proposed NOOP - member has no opinion on the candidate MODIFY - member wants to change some minor detail (e.g. reference/description) REVIEWING - member is reviewing/researching the candidate RECAST - candidate must be significantly modified, e.g. split or merged REJECT - candidate is "not a vulnerability", or a duplicate, etc. Please write your vote on the line that starts with "VOTE: ". If you want to add comments or details, add them to lines after the VOTE: line. ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0510 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A router or firewall allows source routed packets from arbitrary hosts. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0511 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF IP forwarding is enabled on a machine which is not a router or firewall. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0523 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF ICMP echo (ping) is allowed from arbitrary hosts. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0524 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF ICMP information such as netmask and timestamp is allowed from arbitrary hosts. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0525 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF IP traceroute is allowed from arbitrary hosts. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0528 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A router or firewall forwards external packets that claim to come from inside the network that the router/firewall is in front of. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0529 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A router or firewall forwards packets that claim to come from IANA reserved or private addresses, e.g. 10.x.x.x, 127.x.x.x, 217.x.x.x, etc. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0532 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A DNS server allows zone transfers. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0533 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A DNS server allows inverse queries. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0550 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A router's routing tables can be obtained from arbitrary hosts. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0571 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF Reference: BUGTRAQ:Feb5,1999 A router allows arbitrary hosts to connect to its configuration service, or related services such as telnet. VOTE: ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0588 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990726 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A filter in a router or firewall allows unusual fragmented packets. VOTE:
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